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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the likelihood of conflict between the U.S. and China given 
their competition for energy resources in Africa. The main argument in this thesis is that 
economic interdependence between these countries has gradually produced increasing 
levels of cooperation over a period of three decades, reducing the likelihood of conflict. 
Furthermore, it asserts that historical wars over resources between major powers are less 
likely in contemporary times due to the transformation of the international landscape 
since World War II, resulting in an environment more conducive for cooperation between 
interdependent countries. The cooperation that has emerged between the U.S. and China 
in an array of fields creates a positive environment for tackling mutual energy resource 
challenges cooperatively. Finally, a series of recommendations are offered about ways to 
maximize cooperation and minimize challenges in this relationship.  
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I. U.S. AND CHINA’S COMPETITION FOR OIL RESOURCES 
IN AFRICA 
In recent years, China has experienced impressive economic growth, and as a 
consequence, it has changed from a net oil exporting country to one that is increasingly 
dependent on imported energy resources.1 Recent discovery of oil in African countries 
and their territorial waters has attracted several countries to this region, as oil-importing 
countries have begun to consider Africa as an alternative to more unstable security 
environment in other energy-rich regions of the world.2 In particular, Africa is of interest 
to the United States (U.S.) and China because of its relatively inexpensive and high 
quality crude oil, and therefore the potential it offers in fueling each country’s economic 
engine.3  
Although most of this oil is sold in the open market, the manner in which China is 
gaining access to energy resources in this region has created concern in the U.S. The 
Bush administration described Chinese attempts to gain access to global energy resources 
as “acting as if they can somehow ‘lock up’ energy supplies around the world or seek to 
direct markets rather than opening them up—as if they can follow a mercantilism 
borrowed from a discredited era,” suggesting an adverse impact on U.S. interests.4 
Analysts who believe that China will eventually become a power capable of balancing 
against the U.S. are particularly concerned about its current search for energy resources.5 
Some among the U.S. political circles have also expressed concerns about the 
implications for the U.S. of China’s influence on global economic markets and its 
growing military capability. Oil consumption is expected to continue to increase in both 
 
1 Vaclav Smil, China’s Past, China’s Future: Energy, Food, Environment (London: Rutledge Curzon, 
2004); Gus Luft, “Fueling the Dragon: China’s Race into the Oil Market,” (2007), 
http://www.iags.org/china.htm. 
2 Alex Perry, “Africa’s Oil Dream,” Time Magazine, May 31, 2007. 
3 Christopher Thompson, “The Scramble for African Oil,” (2007), 
http://www.globalpolicy.org/empire/economy/2007/0614scrambleoil.html. 
4 National Security Strategy of the U.S. of America, March 2006. 
5 Fred Bergsten, “A Partnership of Equals,” Foreign Affairs 87, no. 4 (2008). 
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countries while global energy resources diminish.6 These circumstances lead some to 
assert that the U.S. and China are on a collision course, especially where they compete 
for energy resources in the same area.7 The prospect of competition for scarce energy 
resources leading to military confrontation between these two great powers makes this a 
topic of national interest to both counties.8 How likely is conflict between the U.S. and 
China as energy resources diminish? This thesis argues that the high degree of economic 
interdependence between U.S. and China makes the cost of going to war over resources 
very high; thus, reducing the likelihood of conflict and increasing incentives for greater 
cooperation in other areas.  
The literature on economic interdependence and international conflict falls into 
two major camps: liberal and realist. The main debate between liberals and realists is 
over whether economic interdependence prevents, reduces or has no affect at all on the 
likelihood of conflict. Liberals assert that as countries open their markets and deepen 
exchange with others they become less likely to engage in conflict. Liberals also contend 
that the greater the level of economic interdependence between two countries, the less 
likely they are to go to war.9 Essentially, this argument asserts that the cost of going to 
war between two highly trade interdependent countries is so high that both sides work to 
resolve tensions without the use of force. Some liberal scholars also argue that as trade 
and foreign investment increase, there is less reason for engaging in territorial expansion 




6 Colin Campbell, “The Coming Global Oil Crises,” Global Policy Forum, 
http://www.oilcrisis.com/Campbell. 
7 John Ghazvinian, Untapped: The Scramble for Africa’s Oil (Orlando: Harcourt, 2007). 
8 Michael Klaire, Resource Wars: The New Global Landscape of Global Conflict (New York: Henry 
Holt and Company, 2001), 213. He argues that resource wars will become, in the years ahead, the most 
distinctive feature of the global security environment.” Furthermore, he states, that there is “a new 
emergence of a new geography of conflict—a global landscape in which competition over vital resources is 
becoming the governing principle behind the disposition and use of military power.” 
9 Dale Copeland, “Economic Interdependence and War: A Theory of Trade Expectations,” 
International Security 20 (1996). 
10 Richard Rosencrance, The Rise of The Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern 
World (New York: Basic Books, 1986). 
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environment conducive to greater communication and dialogue, which can lead to the 
realization of mutual interest and common values.11 Another liberal argument is that the 
economic relationship between domestic actors leads to political cooperation.12  
Realist theorists dismiss the liberal perspective, stressing relative power as the key 
factor affecting the likelihood of conflict. They argue that greater economic 
interdependence produces greater friction between economic partners, which increases 
the chance of war.13 They also discount the importance of low-level interactions, such as 
economic partnerships and cooperation. Realists claim that in an anarchic” international 
environment countries place a greater premium on security issues. Barbieri’s study of 270 
militarized interstate disputes and 14 wars finds that extensive economic interdependence 
actually increases the likelihood that countries will engage in military disputes.14 
Moreover, realists emphasize the experience of historical Great Wars between nations 
that had been engaged in significant trade prior to conflict.  
Some argue that that competition over scarce resources in particular significantly 
increases the probability of war. Klare contends that resource competition played a 
significant role in war historically, from the colonial expansions of the 15th century to 
World Wars I and II.  
The great colonial expansion by the European powers that began in the 15th 
century and continued until the early 19th century was largely driven by the pursuit of 
resources—land, timber, gold, minerals, spices, slaves, furs, rubber, and oil, among 
others—and this outward drive often sparked clashes with the indigenous inhabitants of 
these territories, as well as among the imperial powers themselves. What we call the 
French and Indian War (the Europeans call it the Seven Years War), for instance, was  
 
 
11 Bruce Russett and John O’Neal, Triangulating Peace: Democracy Independence and International 
Organizations (New York: W.W. Norton. Solomon Benjamin, 2001). 
12 Michael Doyle, Ways of War and Peace: Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism (New York: W.W. 
Norton & Company, 1997). 
13 Kenneth Waltz, The Myth of National Interdependence, The International Corporation, ed. C. 
Kindleberger (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2007), 205–23. 
14 Katherine Barbieri, “Economic Interdependence: A Path to Peace or a Source of Interstate 
Conflict?” Journal of Peace Research 33, no. 1 (1996): 29–49. 
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sparked by conflict between Great Britain and France over the control of resource-rich 
territories in North America, India, Africa, and Asia. Many of the skirmishes that led up 
to World War I, especially those arising in Africa, also had this character.15 
Engdahl argues that competition over oil resources contributed to World War I, as 
Great Britain felt its global hegemony threatened by Germany’s rapid ascent as a 
formidable power, based on its technologic boom and rapid population growth.16 In the 
years before the war, Germany and Britain began to compete for access to the newly 
discovered “rock oil” in the Middle East, which was vital to fueling the most advanced 
vehicles and vessels of the time. Germany’s growing dependence on imported oil led it to 
ally with the declining Ottoman Empire, and broker a deal to build a railway from Berlin, 
through Anatolia, to Baghdad, which would have served its need for oil.17 Before the last 
portion leading into Baghdad could be completed, Great Britain reacted to this perceived 
threat to its interests in oil-rich Mesopotamia (Iraq) by sending troops into Baghdad. 
Seeing their chance for access to oil resources cutoff, and realizing that the Russian 
military was weakened because of civil war, Germany and the Ottomans moved into the 
oil rich Caucasus regions of Batum and Baku. This oil rich region was now contested by 
Russia, Britain and Germany, and Engdahl concludes that Germany’s demise during its 
final offensive was a result of insufficient access to Romanian and Baku oil.18  
On the other side of the world, according to Fisher, competition for oil resources 
was also becoming intense. The epicenter of oil interests in this area was Sakhalin Island. 
“There were … four countries and one private party interested in the Sakhalin petroleum: 
Russia, which owned the petroleum, Japan, which wanted it, Great Britain, which upheld 
a rather flimsy claim to it of the Royal Dutch-Shell; Harry F. Sinclair, who had a 
 
15 Michael Klare, Resource Wars: The New Global Landscape of Global Conflict (New York: Henry 
Holt and Company, 2001). 
16 William Engdahl, A Century or War: Anglo-American Oil Politics and the New World Order (Pluto 
Press, 2004), 14. 
17 Ibid., 18. 
18 Ibid., 39. 
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concession for it, and the U.S.”19 Japan had won the southern part of the Island in the 
Russo-Japanese war, but refused to evacuate from the north until it was able to gain oil 
concessions from Russia. According to Henry Sasaki, secretary of the Japanese Embassy 
in Moscow, “Japan was purchasing large quantities of oil from the United State and other 
countries but that these, even taken together with Japan’s domestic yields, did not cover 
the nation’s needs. American oil is too costly as it is transported over 5,000 miles. 
Therefore the Sakhalin oil is of great importance to Japan especially since the Japanese 
port of Hokkaido is only 400 miles away.”20 Fisher claims that this competition led 
directly to World War II.  
Finally, Klare claims that Japan attacked Pearl Harbor in 1941 to preempt U.S. 
intervention in Japan’s quest to take the vital oil resources of the Dutch East Indies due to 
its vital oil resources.21 Japan had been isolated from the West during most of the 19th 
century, when Western powers carved out their interests in the rest of Asia. During the 
Meiji reign (1868–1910), Japan underwent major transformation and modernization, 
amidst an explosive industrial boom. It was almost entirely dependent on imported oil, 
receiving 80 percent of its consumption needs from the U.S., and 13 percent from 
Indonesia.22 Resource competition, heightened by British, French, and American policies 
that limited German and Japanese (and Italian) access to important resources, is seen to 
have played an important role in the lead up to WWII.23 All of these countries had been 
protectionist during the 1930s, creating a situation in which Germany found itself 
surrounded by powers fighting a trade war. Similarly, Japan’s invasion of southern 
Vietnam in 1941 prompted an economic embargo by the U.S. and the Dutch East Indies, 
placing Japan in a desperate situation.  
 
19 Louis Fisher, Oil Imperialism: the International Struggle for Petroleum (London: George Allen & 
Uniwin, 1926), 180. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Henry Sakaida, Imperial Japanese Navy Aces, 1937–45 (Oxford: Osprey Publishing Limited, 1998), 
18. 
22 Yuichi Arima, “The Way to Pearl Harbor: U.S. vs. Japan,” Inventory of Conflict and Environment 
Case Studies 118 (December 2003), http://www.american.edu/TED/ice/japan-oil.htm#table. 
23 J. W. Smith, Economic Democracy: The Political Struggle of the 21st Century, Chapter 5, 4th ed. 
(The Institute for Economic Democratic Press, 2005), http://www.ied.info/wp-content/uploads/economic-
democracy.pdf. 
 6
                                                
Klare, Engdahl and others suggest that America’s quest for resources is similar to 
those that preceded the wars of the twentieth century. They argue that U.S. interventions 
in the Middle East to protect access to energy resources mirror British efforts a century 
earlier.24 Klare also suggests that China’s search for oil mirrors that of Germany during 
the lead up to both World Wars. Based on these historical analogies, Klare contends that 
future wars will be power struggles among great powers over petroleum and other 
dwindling resources.25 He points specifically to U.S. and China’s behavior patterns and 
policies regarding resources to illustrate the potential for conflict between these countries 
as resources diminish, noting that U.S. foreign policy has historically reflected a 
commitment to using military force to protect America’s access to oil resources abroad.26 
In work with Daniel Yergin, he offers evidence in support of that claim from the Carter 
Doctrine to U.S. military intervention in Iraq.27 Finally, in his latest book he adds that 
Russia’s growing influence as an energy superpower, coupled with China and India’s 
rapid economic rise, will lead to a new Cold War environment that is likely to result in 
conflict among these countries.28  
David Victor, noting that much of what has been written on the potential for 
resources wars in the 21st century is “very much conjecture and speculation,” argues that 
resource wars are actually rare, and when resource competition does lead to conflict it 
often does so as one part of a complex multi-causal phenomena.29 He also notes that oil 
in particular is a fungible commodity. For example, China sells most of the oil it extracts 
in Africa on the international market, where it sells to the nearest buyer for at a price set 
 
24 William Engdahl, A Century or War. 
25 Michael Klare, Resource Wars: The New Global Landscape of Global Conflict (New York: Henry 
Holt and Company, 2001). 
26 Michael Klare, Blood and Oil: The Dangers and Consequences of American’s Dependency on 
Imported Oil (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2005). 
27 Daniel Yergin, The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power (New York: Simon & 
Schuster, 1991). 
28 Michael Klare, Rising Powers, Shrinking Planet: The New Geopolitics of Energy (New York: 
Metropolitan Books, 2008), 36; Vijay Prashad, “A New Cold War Oil,” Frontline (2007), 
http://www.globalpolicy.org/empire/intervention/2007/0812newcw.htm. 
29 David Victor, “What Resource War?,” http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=16020. 
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by the market.30 Victor states that “the best estimates suggest that only about one-tenth 
of the oil produced overseas by Chinese investments (so-called “equity oil”) actually 
makes it back to the country.”31 Pressure from the International Energy Agency and other 
world trade partners force China to manage tensions that arise over oil rather than engage 
in conflict, while China’s strategy to lock in oil resources in Africa have been tamed by 
other external pressures. For example, China has decided to no longer use its veto in the 
United Nations Security Council to protect Sudan’s government, who has been under 
international scrutiny for ethnic cleansing.32   
Given the dramatic differences in the global trade regime of the two centuries and 
the role that protectionism and economic embargos played in exacerbating resource 
competition in the past, the superficial historical parallels suggested by realists are of 
limited value. Indeed, in the 21st century, resource conflicts have taken the form of civil 
wars over water, timber, diamonds and control over energy resources in weak states with 
corrupt governments, primarily in Africa and the Middle East. Therefore, the potential for 
conflict because of resource competition needs to be assessed in light of current global 
condition factors.  
This thesis builds on Victor’s critique and insights, but focuses on a different 
limiting factor in the international system of the 21st century: economic globalization and 
the unprecedented economic interdependence it has produced. It argues that economically 
interdependent countries have a low probability of war both because the costs of war 
between such countries are likely to be greater than the benefits to be won and because 
others states in a globalized economy would be forced to pay part of the cost of such a 
war, and thus would work to avoid it. In short, the international economic system has 
been transformed over the half century in such a manner that it makes going to war over 
resources, especially between economically interdependent states, much less likely than it 
was in the WWI and WWII periods.  
 
30 Smith, Economic Democracy: The Political Struggle of the 21st Century. 
31 David Victor, “What Resource War?,” http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=16020 
accessed November 17, 2008. 
32 Smith, Economic Democracy: The Political Struggle of the 21st Century. 
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Globalization has evolved in two main waves with an interim period of slowdown 
between the world wars. The first wave occurred from approximately 1870 to 1913. This 
period was driven by mobility in international capital flow and labor, as well as 
immigration to Western countries and a series of innovations in the transportation 
industry.33 After being interrupted by a period of protectionism, globalization surged 
after WWII, pushed by the economic policies of the U.S. and its Western partners and by 
international institutions established to prevent a reoccurrence of the destructive 
economic policies of the 1930s. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)–
the predecessor of the World Trade Organization (WTO), International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), World Bank and others helped create greater levels of globalization—trade 
liberalization, open markets and economic integration and interdependence.  
These institutions contributed significantly to the reduction of tariffs and 
economic reforms that resulted in an increase in capital flows and foreign direct 
investment. “[T]he average tariff level after WWII was reduced from 40 percent in 1946 
to about 5 percent in 1992. As a result, total real exports grew by 14 times during the 
same period. Moreover, U.S. total trade levels equaled less than 10 percent of its gross 
national product (GNP) in the early 1950s, but it reached almost 25 percent of GNP at the 
end of the 1990s.”34 “Capital flows averaged about $384 billion from 1980–1994 … and 
jumped to about $1.7 trillion in 1996.”35 “Global FDI consisted of 12 percent of global 
capital flows in the early 1980s and grew to about 25 percent in early to mid-1990s.”36  
The opening of China to the global market in the 1980s significantly increased the 
degree of economic globalization: its economy has grown 12 fold, and its trade with the 
rest of the world has increased by a factor of 30.37 China’s total trade is equal to 
 
33 Das K. Dilip. “The Economic Dimension of Globalization,” Chapter 2, 31, 
http://www.eclac.cl/publicaciones/xml/0/10030/Globalization-Chap2.pdf. 
34 Joseph Grieco, The International Political Economy since World War II (Duke University, 2000), 
2–3.  
35 Ibid., 2–3. 
36 Ibid., 7. 
37Anthony Venables, “The China Effect,” Centre Piece (2006), 
http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/CP208.pdf, 11. 
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approximately 70 percent of its GDP.38 Its competitive advantage has provided the rest of 
the world with access to lower priced consumer goods, increasing trade/GDP ratios in 
many countries, including the U.S. 
The remainder of the thesis will argue that these forces of globalization have 
created a web of countries and institutions that work together to address tensions before 
they escalate to war. Chapter II looks at how increasing economic interdependence has 
affected the level and nature of cooperation between U.S. and China. Finally, Chapter III 
concludes by returning to current resource competition between the U.S. and China in 
Africa, using the findings from the case studies to explore the likelihood of conflict 
and/or cooperation. Furthermore, the concluding chapter offers a list of recommendations 
for both countries to consider in the future.  
 
38 Venables, “The China Effect,” 13. 
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II.  U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS 
This chapter examines the role the economic relationship between U.S. and China 
has played in creating a growing spirit of cooperation, which in turn has muted tensions 
between the two nations since the mid-twentieth century. The first section compares the 
current level of U.S.-China economic interdependence to that of countries that went to 
war in the two World Wars. The second section provides a brief review of the effects of 
globalization on China’s integration with the world, economic growth, and global 
cooperative behavior. The third section demonstrates that closer U.S.-China economic 
relations have led to increasingly proactive and effective management of conflict, as well 
as increased cooperation in areas other than economics. The evidence will show that as 
the U.S.-China economic relationship increased so did their level of cooperation. As 
cooperation grew, the two countries were increasingly willing and able to manage 
tensions as they emerged, thus avoiding escalation toward conflict.  
A. ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE  
The main indicators of economic interdependence are global trade as a percentage 
of GDP for each, U.S.-China bilateral trade as a percentage of total trade for each, and 
U.S. dependence on China for financing of its national debt. Debt financing is not 
normally included as a measure of interdependence, but it is an important one in the U.S.-
China case. China currently holds 20 percent of total foreign-held U.S. Treasury debt and 
23 percent of U.S. agency and government–sponsored enterprise securities.39 As a result, 
U.S. dollar-denominated assets, mostly U.S. Treasury bills and bonds, comprise almost 
80 percent of China’s foreign reserve holdings.40 On all three measures, U.S.-China 
economic interdependence has grown from virtually zero in 1950 to historically 
unprecedented levels in the 2000s. As this interdependence grew, the relationship shifted 
 
39 James Dorn, “The Debt Threat: A Risk to U.S.-China Relations?” Brown Journal of World Affairs 
14, no. 2 (2008): 151. 
40 Wayne Morrison, “China-U.S. Trade Issues,” Report for the Congressional Research Service 
(2009): 1, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33536.pdf. 
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from a primarily political focus to a fundamentally economic one. During the last two 
decades, the relationship has also grown to encompass other areas of mutual and global 
interests, such as combating proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, 
taming rogue regimes like North Korea, and cooperating in the field of energy and 
environment. As communism has taken a backseat to economic growth, the CCP has 
come to view maintaining economic growth and prosperity as critical to its political 
survival. Therefore, great emphasis has been placed on safeguarding the economic 
relationship with the U.S. in order to ensure continued economic growth. Similarly, U.S. 
election outcomes are fundamentally affected by economic performance and the U.S. has 
come to view China as a critical market for a growing demand of America’s domestic 
consumers and investors, and an important source of financing for its ever-growing 
public debt. As a result, the relationship with China has become just as important to the 
U.S. 
In the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, U.S.-China trade was almost non-existent. In 
1980, trade was fairly low at approximately $5 billion. However, China’s total trade had 
reached $41 billion, which was 22 percent of its GDP, $188 billion.41 Therefore, U.S.-
China $5 billion represented 12 percent of China’s total trade. In 1978, China ranked as 
the 32nd largest export market and U.S. the 57th largest sources of U.S. imports. In 2008, 
U.S.-China trade reached more than $400 billion, making China the second largest U.S. 
trader, after Canada, the third largest U.S. export market, after Canada and Mexico and 
the largest source of U.S. imports.42 U.S. trade with China amounted to approximately 12 
percent of its total world trade of $3.3 trillion in 2008. China’s trade with the U.S. 
amount to 13 percent its total world trade of $2.5 trillion during the same period.43 Many 
highlight the fact that U.S. has a large trade deficit with China, and that American lose 
jobs to China. Traditional methods of determining economic interdependence take into 
account the relative equitable bilateral trade between countries. Although trade between 
these countries is not equitable, the economic relation is balanced insofar as both 
 
41 Economic Statistics, Nation Masters, http://www.nationmaster.com/graph/eco_tra_of_gdp-
economy-trade-of-gdp. 
42 Morrison, “China-U.S. Trade Issues,” 1. 
43 U.S.-China Business Council, http://www.uschina.org/statistics/tradetable.html.  
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countries are dependent on each other and are vulnerable to disruption on either side. 
Raising trade barriers against China would significantly affect China’s export-dependent 
market; while significantly raising the cost of Chinese merchandise in American 
department stores. Additionally, if Beijing decides to stop its accumulation of U.S. debt it 
would result high inflation and increased interest rates. Additionally, many fail to 
recognize that U.S. is predominantly a service economy, such as “travel and tourism, 
banking, insurance, entertainment, law, software, and telecommunications.”44 U.S. 
private service sector “accounts for more than two-thirds of GDP…four-fifths its 
workforce…and one-third its exports.”45 The U.S. is now China’s largest export market 
and its number one source of cumulative foreign direct investment (FDI) since 2003.46 In 
recent years, Chinese imports to the U.S. have stimulated one of the strongest global 
economic engines: American consumerism. China is also an important source of FDI for 
the U.S. “In the past decade, [U.S.] exports to China have increased six times faster than 
… exports to the rest of the world. A recent study by the U.S. Business Council found 
that over 90 percent of U.S. congressional districts had triple-digit export growth to 
China in the past eight years.”47 In addition, the U.S. has depended heavily on Chinese 
investment in U.S. treasury bonds to finance its perennial deficit spending. China holds 
over $800.5 billion in U.S. treasury bonds, which is approximately 24 percent of the total 
foreign-held U.S. security holdings.48 This places China at the top of the list of all 
foreign holders of U.S. treasury bonds. Therefore, a decline in the value of the dollar 
adversely affects China, a “10 percent decline in the dollar generates a loss of 3 percent 
of China’s gross domestic product.”49 This means that China is loath to sell the billions 
 
44 Craig VanGrasstek, “The Benefits of U.S.-China Trade in Service,” 2006, 
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46 Thomas Lum, “China’s Trade with U.S. and the rest of the World,” Congressional Research Service 
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total FDI from 2003-2008. See Table 3. 
47 Alan Holmer. Special Envoy for China and the Strategic Economic Dialogue on the U.S.-China 
Strategic Economic Growth at the Wuhan University, http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/hp992.htm.  
48 Department of the Treasury/Federal Reserve Board, http://www.treas.gov/tic/mfh.txt. 
49 Gregory Chin and Eric Helleiner, “China as a Creditor: A Rising Financial Power?” Journal of 
International Affairs 68, no. 1 (2008): 2.  
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of dollars it holds it has accumulated in reserve because of the trade imbalance between 
the two countries, for fear of undermining its own economy. Thus, using dollar reserves 
to finance U.S. government debt serves Chinese, as well as U.S. economic interests. In 
2003, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao described “the win-win and mutually beneficial 
economic cooperation and trade:”50 
American companies bring to China their capital, advanced technology 
and managerial expertise. In return, China’s abundant human resources 
and huge market provide for American companies enormous business 
opportunities. Furthermore, Chinese enterprises supply U.S. consumers 
with large quantities of inexpensive and quality consumer goods.51 
This demonstrates the significance of this economic relationship, but it is also 
important to evaluate their levels of cooperation. The following analysis categorizes 
cooperation as low, medium or high. A low level of bilateral cooperation is characterized 
by ceasefire agreements, diplomatic recognition, minor treaties, normalization of 
relations, and low-level diplomatic talks. A medium level of bilateral cooperation is 
defined by cooperation in areas like education and cultural exchanges, which represent 
higher levels of cooperation than diplomatic relations alone. Higher levels of diplomatic 
talks, such as senior diplomatic visits and more frequent meetings, as well as treaties and 
agreements concerning more important issues is also indicative of medium level 
cooperation. In the highest level of cooperation, diplomatic talks are held at the highest 
levels of diplomatic seniority, such as the President, Vice President, Premier and high 
level ministers and secretaries, such as those in the area of defense, economic and foreign 
affairs, and frequencies of meetings are institutionalized conducted. This level exhibits 
greater contacts in the area of defense and frequency of military-to-military exercises, 
and cooperation in the area of maintaining mutual security, such as, terrorism and piracy. 
This level is also characterized by greater cooperation on global issues, such as anti-
proliferation of WMD, space, nuclear, energy, environmental concerns, which requires 
both parties to give up a certain degree of autonomy in providing for their own security.   
 
50 Wen Jiabao. Speech delivered during a dinner in Washington sponsored by nine American 
organizations, http://china.org.cn/english/features/82092.htm.  
51 Ibid. 
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B. U.S. CHINA ECONOMIC RELATIONS, COOPERATION AND 
REDUCTION IN CONFLICT 
U.S.-China relations began as early as 1844, when the Treaty of Wanghia 
established basic trade regulations, allowed American missionaries certain rights in 
China, and created rules on expatriation of U.S. Citizens.52 The late nineteenth to early 
twentieth century was a tumultuous period for China, because of a devastating war with 
Japan. During the second Sino-Japanese War, 1937–1945, the U.S. gave China general 
“sympathy, moral support and some small loans, but it was the Soviet Union that 
extended most of the substantial material aid to China during this period.”53 By 1940, 
China’s exports to and imports from the U.S. were 28.62 percent and 21.3 percent of its 
total exports and imports, respectively.54 During WWII, U.S. cooperated with China 
against Japan by providing it approximately $1.5 billion in credits and aid under the Lend 
Lease program from 1941–1946.55 “Not only did Washington grant China a $300 million 
loan for currency stabilization, but it persuaded London to issue a joint renunciation of all 
unequal treaties of the past century on January 11, 1943.”56 Due to the U.S.’ dominant 
economic position in the wake of WWII, most of China’s trade was with the U.S. Imports 
from the U.S. were 61 percent, 57 percent and 66 percent of the total and exports to the 
U.S. were 38 percent, 23 percent, and 20 percent of the total in 1946, 1947 and 1948, 
respectively.57 However, the Communist victory and establishment of the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, followed by the Korean War, completely severed U.S.-
China economic relations. 
The 1950s and 1960s were characterized by a low level of economic 
interdependence, no significant cooperation, and high levels of tension, including fighting 
 
52 Toru Kubo, “China's Economic Development and the International Order in Asia, 1930s–50s,” 
http://eh.net/XIIICongress/cd/papers/8Kubo67.pdf. 
53 Immanuel Hsu, The Rise of Modern Politics of the Asian-Pacific (London-New York: Routledge, 
2004), 600. 
54 Kubo, “China's Economic Development and the International Order in Asia.” 
55 Hsu, The Rise of Modern Politics of the Asian-Pacific, 601. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Ibid., 9–10. 
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over the Korean peninsula, disputes over Taiwan, tension over U.S. presence in Vietnam 
and U.S. efforts to isolate China from the rest of the international community. During the 
1950s, the Soviet Union replaced the U.S. as the PRC’s primary trading partner. “Trade 
with the Soviet bloc accounted for 65.3 percent of China’s total trade … and U.S.-China 
trade virtually ceased by 1954.”58 The Korean War (1950–1953) proved to be the 
beginning of the Cold War in Asia. President Truman imposed an economic embargo, 
which prevented U.S. trade with China until the early 1970s. In the absence of significant 
economic interdependence, strategic and ideological differences and the U.S.’ refusal to 
recognize the PRC severely limited cooperation. U.S. backing of Taiwan proved to be a 
major area of tension for the next five decades. However, evidence below will show that 
as economic interdependence grew, the U.S. and China dealt with all these perennial 
challenges, especially this in the case of Taiwan, in an increasingly cooperative manner, 
carefully and effectively avoiding disruption in their economic relations.  
The 1970s saw the beginning of economic relations and the very beginnings of a 
process of building mutual trust, but not yet significant cooperation. In 1971, U.S. and 
China began indirect diplomatic contacts leading to Secretary of State Henry Kissinger’s 
visit to China in July 1971 and President Richard Nixon’s visit in June 1972. Discussions 
between Chairman Mao Tse Tung and President Nixon held during these visits resulted 
in the formal opening of trade between China and the U.S. trade grew from 
approximately $90 million in 1972 to $2.45 billion in 1979. China registered GDPs of 
$112 billion and $115 billion in 1972 and 1979, respectively. The U.S.’ GDP during the 
same periods were $1.2 trillion and 2.45 trillion. The trade to GDP ratios is relatively 
insignificant give such low number of trade volume. Such drastic change in the foreign 
policies of both countries required the highest state-level meeting to take place before as 
the catalyst to future economic relations and cooperation. However, political and 
ideological differences made this period difficult to work through, as did “uncertainty 
regarding Mao’s death and pressure from the Gang of Four—whose members opposed 
 
58 William Long, Economic Incentive and Bilateral Cooperation (Michigan: University of Michigan 
Press, 1996), 50. 
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reliance on foreign technology caused a period of slow down in trade.”59 Similarly, 
President Nixon was distracted by the Water Gate scandal, which led to his resignation in 
1974. Additionally, he faced senate opposition against normalization with China. 
Although President Ford pledged to normalize relations with Beijing, he too met 
challenges from the U.S. senate. In 2007, former President Carter said, “You have to 
understand that Communism in those days was the same epithet as Terrorism is today.”60 
Ideological differences at this time trumped cooperation because the level of economic 
interdependence remained low. As the positive impact of the opening of bilateral 
economic relations made them increasingly felt in subsequent decades, ideological 
difference would become less of an obstacle to improving U.S.-China relations.   
Deng Xiaoping regained preeminence in 1978, after a short period of absence 
because he had been purged for disagreeing with Mao. He returned with ambitions to 
open China’s market to foreign trade and investment in order to bring about more growth 
and development. Although the level of economic interdependence was still relatively 
low, basic cooperation began. In December 1978, the U.S. established official relations 
with the PRC, recognizing it as the official government of China, acknowledged that 
Taiwan was part of China, and disestablished official relations with the government of 
Taiwan. Washington also granted Beijing the status of Most Favorite Nation (MFN), 
which “treated Chinese imports like those of GATT members for tariff purpose.”61 “The 
MFN agreement led to acceleration in U.S.-China trade—from $2.45 billion in 1979 to 
$6.85 billion in 1981.”62 This was still a small percentage of U.S. total trade, which 
reached just over $400 billion in 1981. U.S.’ GDP in 1981 was $3.11 trillion, so trade 





59 Library of Congress Country Studies, http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/cshome.html. 
60 Daniel Schearf, “China Spoke about key of U.S.-China Relations,” VOA NEWS, 
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61 Long, Economic Incentive and Bilateral Cooperation, 53. 
62 Ibid. 
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China’s GDP was just under $200 billion the same year, but China’ total trade was 
approximately 25 percent of its GDP during the same year. The U.S.-China trade made 
up over 3 percent its GDP.63 
Michael Mastanduno argues, “[a]s one state gradually expands economic 
interaction with its target, the resulting interdependence creates vested interests within the 
target society and government. The beneficiaries of interdependence become addicted to 
it, and they protect their interests by pressuring the government to accommodate the 
source of interdependence.”64 In the U.S.-China case, this dynamic was first reflected in 
initiatives by both Presidents Richard Nixon and Jimmy Carter that sought to gain greater 
cooperation as economic interdependence with China increased. In his resignation speech 
in 1974, President Nixon said, “we must now ensure that the one quarter of the world’s 
people who live in the People’s Republic of China will be and remain not our enemies 
but our friends.”65 Bilateral economic relationship was becoming critical to both 
countries. Carter said that he established relations with China because he foresaw China’s 
developmental potential.66 Tapping into such a large and populated country like China 
would create an enormous market for the U.S. Moreover, the U.S. would be able to tap 
into China’s cheap labor. This new relationship would open doors to cooperation in other 
venues, which was critical in the changing international environment. This helped ease 
domestic opposition that insisted that trade relations with China would cause a moral 
hazard because it would incentivize lack of domestic reform and help modernize a 
potential future enemy. Nonetheless, economic relations that were developed in the future 
proved that bilateral trade relations not only resulted in mutual economic benefits but 
increased bilateral cooperation.  
 
63 World Bank, World Development Indicator, http://datafinder.worldbank.org/about-world-
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64 Michael Mastanduno, “The Strategy of Economic Engagement: Theory and Practice,” in Economic 
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University of Michigan Press, 2003), 182–183. 
65 PBS Presidential Links, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/character/links/nixon_speech.html.  
66 Quoted in Schearf, “China Spoke about key of U.S.-China Relations.” 
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The 1980s represented a marked increase in economic interdependence and 
cooperation. This period was characterized by improved economic trade, investment and 
joint ventures, more and broader cooperation, and a very low level of tension. Bilateral 
trade grew from approximately $4.7 billion in 1980 to almost $18 billion in 1989.67 This 
was significantly important to China growth because $4.7 billion equated to 10 percent of 
its total trade with the world; China’s total trade, $41 billion, was 22 percent of its $180 
billion GDP.68 The importance of U.S.-China trade was even more important in 1989 
when $18 billion equated to 15 percent of its total trade, $116 billion, which was then 34 
percent of China’s $345 billion GDP.69 U.S.-China trade was important to the U.S. 
during this period, but much less than China, given that U.S.’ total trade only made up 
approximately 20 percent of its massive GDP, $2.7 trillion and $5.4 trillion in 1980 and 
1989 respectively.70 However, U.S. benefited much more from the cheap Chinese 
products, which allowed the U.S. to invest in other areas.  
Liberalization of the Chinese economy also drew U.S. FDI into China for the first 
time (see the chart in the Appendix).71 Technology exchange increased, along with U.S.-
China joint ventures, culminating in a “new [U.S.] policy in 1983 of treating China like 
other Western nations [sic] for most high technology exports… license application more 
than doubled between 1983 and 1985 from 4,300 to 10,200, and the value of licensed 
exports grew tenfold from $374 million in 1980 to $3,366 billion in 1986.”72 In the late 
1980s, China had moved up to the sixteenth largest trading partner of the U.S., while the 
U.S. was already China’s third largest. More than 140 American firms had investments in 
China.73 This increased interdependence led to a stronger overall relationship and more 
cooperation. First, diplomatic visits became more frequent. President Reagan visited 
 
67 See the Appendix.  
68 Economic Statistics, Nation Masters. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Kevin Honglin Zangh, “Why is U.S. Direct Investment in China so Small?” Contemporary 
Economic Policy (2000): 82–94. 
72 Long, Economic Incentive and Bilateral Cooperation, 54–55. 
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China in 1984, President Li Xiannan visited the U.S. the next year, and in February 1989, 
President George H. W. Bush visited China. Security cooperation increased, particularly 
vis-à-vis the Soviet Union as the U.S. and China became strategic partners against the 
Soviet threat. A strengthening China was viewed as less threatening than a strong Soviet 
Union. “The Reagan administration, after a two-year hiatus, further expanded security 
cooperation with Beijing to reinforce and strengthen the strategic alignment of the U.S. 
and China against the Soviet Union.”74 This increased security cooperation consisted of 
arms sales, intelligence sharing, and arms sales. Increased cooperation led to some 
compromise on the issue of Taiwan on both sides. The U.S. and China signed a third 
communiqué stating that the U.S. would gradually reduce the levels of arms sales to 
Taiwan and China promised to strive toward a peaceful resolution to the Taiwan case.75   
The U.S. and China also began to express shared concerns regarding North Korea, 
even though China had been a staunch ally of North Korea for many years. Although, 
from the Chinese perspective an alliance with the Democratic People’s Republic of 
Korean (DPRK) served its interest, Pyongyang’s overtures to the Soviet Union in the 
1980s were not particularly welcome to Beijing. The DPRK viewed China’s 
rapprochement with the U.S. and improving relations with South Korea and Japan, as a 
threat. Therefore, it sought closer relations with the Soviet Union. Rivalry between North 
and South Korea could destabilize the peninsula, which was not in the interest of China.  
During the 1980s, the U.S. no longer viewed China as a major threat. China 
viewed the Soviet Union as a greater threat than the U.S. The growth in economic 
interdependence increased their confidence, allowing for further cooperation in military 
sector. U.S.-China cooperation also increased in jet fighter testing and design 
improvements, while the U.S. provided technology and financing for more than twelve 
Chinese satellite launches, which improved its space capabilities.76 Multiple high-level 
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defense and military-to-military exchange activities also took place in the 1980s. “[I]n 
1986, U.S. Navy ships made their first Chinese port call since 1949.”77 Following these 
visits, sales of American military gear and equipment were made to assist China’s 
military modernization. Although the sales were limited to non-weapons related 
equipment, this showed great progress in their relations, since sales of this military 
technology allowed China to close most of the gap in capabilities that had been created 
by earlier U.S. prohibitions.78 The U.S. and China also made great inroads towards 
nuclear cooperation during this period. In 1983, they signed a Nuclear Cooperation 
agreement, and in 1984, China joined the International Atomic Energy Agency and 
established nuclear material control measures. In 1988, China began to submit annual UN 
declaration data of the confidence-building measures for the Biological Weapons 
Convention.79  
U.S.-China cooperation also extended to exchanges that allowed citizens of both 
countries the opportunity to learn about each other’s cultures for the first time in the 
1980s. In addition to high-level diplomatic visits, many professionals at different levels 
were able to travel to opposite countries in order to exchange perceptions and ideas. In 
addition, thousands of Chinese students sent to pursue their education in the U.S., which 
was previously not allowed. 
Cooperation became evident even in areas of significant previous tension, such as 
human rights. China became a member of the International Human Rights Convention in 
1982, and subsequently, ratified several human right conventions. However, setbacks in 
this area occurred because of China’s excessive force used on Chinese students protesting 
in Tiananmen Square. The U.S. imposed the following sanctions: a suspension of 
Overseas Private Investment, U.S. Trade and Development, export licensing for defense, 
Agency (USTDA) financing, for satellites contracted to be launched in China, crime 
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control and detection instruments and equipment; denial of technology related to nuclear 
production and articles and defense services on the U.S. munitions list.80 Nonetheless, 
economic relations continued despite a period of sanctions. Although the U.S. continued 
to express verbal discontent with regard to violations of human rights in the 1980s, it also 
worked to managed tension of this period effectively and pursued cooperation in other 
areas. Furthermore, the sanctions that were imposed did not have much effect on the 
relationship because most of the sanctions were a continuation of previous ones. 
Moreover, over the years the Administration has relieved most of the effects of the 
sanction all together.  
Sanctions were designed to satisfy U.S. domestic pressure, without hindering the 
U.S.-China relationship. Although human right issues are still brought up on occasion, 
less pressure is placed on China over these matters, because Washington does not want to 
risk hindering the economic relationship with Beijing. “The power of Congress, once 
significant because so much hung on the annual possibility that favorable trade could be 
suspended, has been diffused. The sanctions that remain in place today can all be 
modified, eased, or lifted altogether by the President, without congressional 
input…Congress and the Administration each recognize the importance of China’s 
emerging ability to consume and to produce, and China has become an increasingly 
important trading partner of the U.S.”81  
The Tiananmen Square massacre caused considerable tensions in U.S.-China 
relations. As a promoter of human rights throughout the world, the U.S. was forced to 
take some measures to punish Beijing for its actions. There was a debate in the U.S. on 
what those measures should involve. President Bush wrestled with striking a balance 
between appeasing Congress, which pressured the Administration to refuse MFN status 
to China and those that lobbied for protecting economic relations, such as the business 
sector. President Bush knew that by:  
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Raising tariff levels on Chinese goods entering the American market by an 
average of 40 percent, the repeal of MFN status would strike at the heart 
of the rapidly growing commercial relations between the two countries. 
Congress was not oblivious or naïve to think that cutting ties with China 
would have no economic consequences, but they had to deal with the 
pressure from their constituents who abhorred China’s reaction to the 
protestors in Tiananmen Square. The public was well aware of the 
Tiananmen incident due to the extensive attention given to it by the 
American media coverage. It would also seem likely that the climate 
created by such a step would have precluded genuine cooperation over the 
range of political and security issues that concerned both the U.S. and 
China.82  
Therefore, President Bush bought off on imposing sanctions, but the sanctions 
were specific enough so that the Chinese government would understand that the U.S. was 
obliged to take action due to domestic pressures. Nonetheless, China knew that these 
sanction had no real negative consequences, making it clear to both parties that 
cooperation would continue, and it did. In fact, U.S.-China economic relations and 
overall cooperation improved significantly during this subsequent period. Although there 
was significant domestic debate over how to approach China policy after Tiananmen, 
President Bush was reluctant to make decisions that would significantly harm U.S.-China 
relations. He viewed China as strategically important and believed that “growing 
economic interaction between the two countries was important for the development of a 
more open and democratic system in China.”83 He opened the lines of communications 
with the Chinese Embassy and attempted to call the Chinese president on several 
occasions. He also immediately dispatched diplomatic delegations on several occasions 
to help manage this crisis, to include National Security Advisor, Brent Scowcroft, Deputy 
Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger, and former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger 
and President Nixon.84 The message sent to the Chinese leadership was essentially that 
the bilateral relationship had been valuable to both, but that he shared the American 
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public’s dismay for what had occurred in Tiananmen Square. In order to move forward, 
President Bush urged the Chinese to show signs of good gesture, which Deng did. While 
Bush waived congressionally imposed limitations on Export-Import Bank lending for 
China, Beijing released 573 Tiananmen incident detainees and lifted martial law.85 
Additionally, Bush engaged domestic opposition to work on a compromise resolution on 
U.S. China policy.  
C. 1990–2000 
During this period, the U.S. continued to be one of China’s most important 
foreign investors. “From 1994 to 2001, the direct investment position, or cumulative 
investments, of U.S. MNC [Multinational Corporations] more than quadrupled, from $2.6 
billion to $10.5 billion. By 2005, U.S. become the second largest cumulative investor in 
China after Hong Kong,”86 registering $3.1 billion in utilized investment in China. U.S.’ 
FDI stock in China was $28.3 billion in 2007, a 21 percent jump from the previous year, 
while China’s FDI stock in the U.S. was $1.1 billion, a 12.1 percent increase from 
2006.87 U.S. FDI flow to China has actually decreased from approximately 10 percent to 
3 percent of total utilized FDI in China. FDI inflow originating from China was $363 
million, which was relatively low compared with Europe; 70 percent of all FDI inflow to 
the U.S. originates now from Europe.88 Additionally, U.S. R&D also increased during 
the same period, making China the 11th largest recipient of U.S. R&D in 2000, up from a 
ranking of 30th in 1994.89 Furthermore, overall trade during the 1990s continued to grow 
at a rapid rate, despite several tense incidents throughout the period. U.S.-China trade 
rose from just over $20 billion in 1990 to over $116 billion just before the turn of the 
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century.90 U.S.’ total trade in 1990 was approximately $900 billion, and trade made up 
20.5 percent of its GDP, making U.S.-China trade more than 2 percent of its total trade. 
China’s total trade during the same years was 35 percent of its GDP.91 In 2000, U.S. total 
trade reached almost $2 trillion or 26 percent of its GDP, $9.7 trillion. U.S.-China trade 
made up almost 6 percent of its total trade. China’s trade to GDP ratio was almost 70 
percent, or $840 billion of $1.2 trillion, making U.S.-China approximately 14 percent of 
China’s total trade.92  
Diplomatic contacts increased during this period. In 1992, President Bush met 
with Premier Li Peng during the Premier’s U.N. visit. In 1993, Chinese president Jiang 
Zemin held talks with President Clinton while visiting for the Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation summit in Seattle. In 1997, Chinese President Jiang Zemin made an official 
visit to Washington where he and President Clinton issued a “joint communiqué calling 
for strengthening cooperation toward a constructive strategic partnership in the 21st 
century.” In 1998, President Clinton flew to Beijing to discuss their bilateral relations, 
major regional and international issues. The following year Chinese Premier, Zhu Rongji 
visited President Clinton in the U.S. In October 2001, President Bush visited China. This 
was followed by another visit of made by President Bush in February 2002, and 
reciprocated by President Zemin’s to Crawford, Texas in October 2002. In 2003, 
President Bush and President Hu Jingtao met in Evian and Bangkok, and Bush hosted 
Premier Wen Jiabao. In 2005, the U.S. president met with his Chinese counterpart and the 
Premier. The same year the U.S.-China Senior Dialogue was established, meeting first in 
Beijing on November and in Washington the following month. These high-level official 
meetings continued in 2006 where the U.S. and China agreed to improve their trade 
relations. In 2007, Secretary of Defense Gates visited China. In 2008, President Bush 
made his fourth visit to China to attend the Olympic ceremonies. Furthermore, thus far, 
President Obama visited Beijing in November 22, 2009, where he covered many topics,  
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among them the economy, North Korea, Afghanistan, as well as energy and climate 
policy. During this visit, President Hu Jingtao pledged to visit the U.S. some time in 
2010.  
Tensions surrounding Taiwan and trade imbalance mounted in the early part of 
this period. The U.S. Congress began to call for greater pressure on China for a perceived 
failure to address these issues constructively. Tensions spiked in 1995–1996, when China 
conducted a series of missile exercises off the coast of Taiwan and the U.S. ordered two 
aircraft carriers into the area in response. Again, in 1999, North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) peacekeepers accidently bombed the Chinese embassy in 
Belgrade.93 These events led some to believe that a breakdown of the U.S.-China 
relationship was imminent. However, the demands of economic interdependence led both 
governments to take a number of unprecedented steps to avoid conflict and deescalate 
tensions during these incidents. Even though U.S. House voted to disapprove China’s 
MFN status in 1990, President Bush vetoed the bill in recognition of the importance of 
maintaining U.S.-China economic relations. Bush also noted that China was cooperating 
on issues important to the U.S. Bush met with the Chinese Foreign Minister to express 
his gratitude for China not voting against America’s efforts to expel Saddam Hussein 
forces from Kuwait in 1990 and 1991. In the Taiwan crisis, China was transparent in 
communicating its intension to conduct military exercises in the straits. Beijing 
maintained communications with both Washington and Taipei throughout. During the 
crisis, U.S. National Security and State Department officials met Taiwan’s National 
Security Council secretary-general in New York, pointing out that while American 
support for Taiwan was dependable, the U.S.-PRC relationship was also important and 
needed to be managed carefully and that Taiwan’s security was better served by stable 
U.S.-China relations than by instability and high tensions.94 All of this was also backed 
up be the military deterrence of two aircraft carriers in the area. In the Belgrade incident, 
the U.S. made serious efforts to reduce tensions and safeguard the relationship with 
 
93 Shirley Kan, “China-U.S. Aircraft Collision Incident of April 2001: Assessments and Policy 
Implications,” Congressional Research Service (2001): 21, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL30946.pdf. 
94 Wu Xinbo, “Managing Crisis and Sustaining Peace between China and the U.S.,” U.S. Institute of 
Peace (2008), http://www.usip.org/files/resources/PW61_FinalApr16.pdf.  
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China. President Clinton maintained communications with President Jang Zemin. He also 
sent a delegation of U.S. diplomats to Beijing in order to cooperate with Chinese leaders. 
Furthermore, President Clinton made several official remarks expressing his condolences 
for the victims of the attacks. Moreover, he assured Beijing that it would provide it with 
all findings from U.S. and NATO’s investigation.95 At the same time, cooperation 
expanded on other issues. In 1997, “China agreed to stop selling anti-ship missiles to Iran 
… and terminate China-Iran nuclear cooperation.”96 This is solid evidence that U.S.-
China cooperation continued to grow.   
By 1998, the U.S.-China economic relationship had become so important that the 
Clinton Administration explicitly adopted a more constructive economic and defense 
engagement policy.  
The vague term ‘engagement’ came to mean in practice a focus on 
establishing regular meeting by the top leaders and their respective 
ministers and on developing an interdependent relationship with China 
that would encourage not only a wide range of economic exchanges, but 
also exchanges in the military sphere and other dimension of government, 
as well as in areas of beyond government, such as social, cultural, and 
educational interchanges…‘engaging’ China would lead in the long run to 
changes in that country that would make it more market oriented and more 
liberal politically.97  
The new engagement policy helped establish greater cooperation in various fields 
other than economics. Commercial and security concerns were at the forefront of the 
policy, which contributed greatly to helping achieve progress in these areas. The U.S. and 
China were now moving from cooperation at a moderate level towards cooperation at a 
higher level in other areas, such as energy, environment and climate change, science and 
technology, and education.  
U.S.-China trade rose from approximately $116 billion in 2000 to more than $400 
billion in 2008.98 China’s trade with the world amounted to approximately $510 billion 
 
95 Xinbo, “Managing Crisis and Sustaining Peace between China and the U.S.,” 10–14.  
96 Susan Shirk, China: Fragile Superpower (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 223.  
97 Yahuda, The International Politics of the Asia-Pacific, 256–57. 
98 See the Appendix. 
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in 2000 and $2.5 trillion in 2008. Therefore, U.S.-China trade represented 22.7 percent 
and 16 percent respectively. Although the raw numbers are in decline, U.S. still ranked as 
China’s number one trading partner in 2008.99 While the trade aspect of interdependence 
decreased, China has increased its financing of the U.S. national debt by increasing its 
share of U.S. treasury bills from $118 billion in 2002 to just over $800 billion in 2008.100 
This represents an increase of foreign-held U.S. securities from 9 percent to 24 percent in 
2002 and 2008, respectively.101 Following its accession to the World Trade Organization 
in 2001, China’s trade barriers against the U.S. decreased significantly, resulting in an 
increase flood of goods into the American market. In 1990, China was U.S. eighth largest 
source of import, rising to first in 2007–2008.102 “By 2005, average tariff rates on key 
U.S. agricultural exports dropped from 31 percent to 14 percent and on industrial 
products from 25 percent to 9 percent.”103 Therefore, even though U.S. continued to 
register an overall trade deficit in 2008, U.S. exports to China grew “240 percent from 
2001 to 2007, significantly more than exports to any other to ten trade partners.”104 
Furthermore, U.S. trade deficit had grown by approximately $40 billion from 2004–2005 
and decrease by $32, $24, $10 billion during the following three years.105 “By 2008, 
China became the second largest trade partner, its third largest export market, and its 
biggest source of imports, approximately 12 percent of total U.S. trade.”106  
The two countries’ reliance on each other’s economic stability proved to be a 
critical incentive and motivator to work to resolve new challenges that arose and increase 
cooperation in many areas, despite differences in others. Relations became strained again 
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in 2001, when an American EP-3 reconnaissance aircraft landed in the Chinese Island of 
Hainan, after the EP-3 was hit and damaged by a Chinese fighter aircraft, which resulted 
in the Chinese pilot’s death. The American aircrew was detained for 11 days. However, 
once again Washington and Beijing negotiated a peaceful resolution of the crisis. Instead 
of apologizing for the incident, which would have been admission of spying on China, 
Washington expressed contrition for entering Chinese airspace without clearance and for 
the loss of the pilot’s life.107 This incident was managed much better than the Taiwan and 
Belgrade incidents of the 1990s, in that the U.S. responded much quickly and direct, 
without an overwhelming military presence like that of the Taiwan Strait crisis, which 
only served to make matters worse.  
The terrorist attacks on the U.S. on September 11, 2001, created a new 
opportunity for cooperation. Although, China initially expressed some concern over the 
U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, it quickly got on board, providing $300 million in support 
of Afghanistan’s reconstruction and joining the Joint Coordination and Monitoring 
Board, which oversees reconstruction. China also supported the more controversial U.S. 
mission in Iraq by backing the United Nations Resolution 1637, providing financial 
supported, and negotiating debt relief for Iraqi debt, to assist U.S. efforts to bring 
revitalize the Iraqi economy. The Obama administration has been giving this area much 
more attention during its dialogue with China, resulting in better understanding of 
common interests in cooperation on Afghanistan. China is now China pledging an 
additional $75 million in aid for Afghanistan in the next five years, and began to work 
directly with the new Iraqi government.108 China also supported U.S. law enforcement 
initiatives. It allowed the FBI to establish a Legal Attaché Office at the U.S. Embassy in 
Beijing and established a Financial Counterterrorism Working Group to share 
intelligence more broadly. It also reached agreements regarding port security under the 
U.S. Container Security Initiative. Cooperation in this area was a tremendous success, 
leading to U.S. installation of nuclear and radioactive material detection equipment in 
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multiple Chinese mega ports.109 Furthermore, the U.S. waived sanction of exports to 
China related to security equipment.  
Broader military-to-military contacts also grew. In 2002, the Chinese military 
started sending “observers to the large regional exercise called Cobra Gold hosted by 
Thailand and organized by the U.S.”110  
China’s military cooperation has gone much farther than anyone would 
have anticipated. In 2006, China actually joined in a joint exercise 
organized by the U.S. in the Sea of Japan with Japan and four other 
countries aimed at preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. After many 
years of discussion, the PLA and the Pentagon announced plans for a joint 
maritime rescue exercise. By participating in U.S.-led joint exercise China 
sends a signal that it wants to be on the same team with its Asian 
neighbors and the U.S., even militarily.111   
Joint efforts to reduce the threat posed by North Korea’s nuclear weapons 
program were also stepped up in 2003, most prominently within the framework of the Six 
Party Talks, which was established to open up a dialogue between six nations, U.S., 
China, North Korea, South Korea, Japan, and Russia win the goal of finding a peaceful 
resolution of North Korea Nuclear tests. The U.S. has expressed gratitude for China’s 
leadership in the Six Party Talks after it increased pressure on North Korea to reach an 
agreement. In remarks in front of the U.S.-China Security Review Commission, Thomas 
Christensen, deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, stated 
that China has taken “unprecedented action to express concerns to North Korea over its 
provocative missile launches, including working with the U.S. and others to pass the very 
strongly worded UN Security Council resolution 1695, condemning North Korea for its 
provocative behavior and calling on members nations to take concrete actions to curb 
international assistance to North Korea’s nuclear and missile program.”112  
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China has joined the U.S. in opposing Iran’s nuclear ambitions, despite its 
relatively close relationship with Iran, by voting “in favor of UN Security Council 
Resolutions 1737, 1747, and 1803, applying sanction on Iranian individuals and 
companies associated with its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs.”113 China 
pressured the Burmese junta to allow international humanitarian relief groups to enter the 
country after cyclone Nargis. Finally, it has begun to pressure the government of Sudan, 
another ally and a country in which it has significant oil interests, on Darfur, while 
playing an important peacekeeping role for the first time. Although both the U.S. and 
China have their own interests in supporting non-proliferation, this demonstrates a shift 
in China’s willingness to work with the U.S. in this area, whereas in the past it showed 
greater reluctance to do so.  
In 2004, the U.S.-China Science and Technology Agreement was adopted to 
increase cooperation on renewable energy, and a Memorandums of Understanding was 
signed on U.S.-China Energy Policy. This policy will focus on fostering greater dialogue 
concerning energy challenges of the world in order to work together to manage resource 
availability and stability in the energy markets. The following is a list of areas in which 
U.S. and China have been cooperating in the area of energy both bilaterally and 
multilaterally.114  
 Memorandum of Understanding on Bilateral Energy Consultation between 
the State Development Planning Commission (SDPC) and Department of 
Energy (DOE) 
 Energy and Environment Cooperation Initiative between the Chinese 
Government and the U.S. Government 
 Agreement of Intent on Cooperation Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear 
Technology between SDPC and Department of Energy 
 Statement of Intent on Cleaner Air and Cleaner Energy Technology 
Cooperation between SDPC and the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency 
 Statement of Intent on a Cooperative Study of Natural Gas Utilization in 
China between SDPC and the U.S. EPA 
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 Memorandum of Understanding on Bilateral Energy Policy Dialogue 
between National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) and 
USDOE 
 Cooperation Protocol for Clean Energy Tech for 2008 Beijing Olympics 
 China and U.S. also cooperate under multilateral frameworks 
 APEC energy working group  
 International Energy Forum (IEF) 
 Asia Pacific Partnership on clean Development and Climate (APP) 
 Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) 
 Carbon sequestration Leadership Forum (CSLF) 
 International Partnership for the hydrogen economy (IPHE) 
The U.S. moved from a strong bilateral engagement process of meeting through 
the Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade and Joint Economic Commission to a 
Strategic Economic Dialogue and Senior Dialogue under the Bush administration in an 
effort to continue to broaden the areas these partners will try to tackle. These meetings 
have increasingly focused on strategic areas of concern, such as “non proliferation issues, 
counterterrorism cooperation, law enforcement cooperation, global issues from 
environment to health, and science and technology.”115  
In the face of the global economic crises, the Obama Administration seems to be 
moving toward an even stronger bond in the U.S.-China relations. The Administration 
has continued the previous dialogues, but renamed them the Strategic and Economic 
Dialogues, in recognition of the intent to take on even greater global issues. The new 
talks are composed of even more senior members of the cabinet. The Secretary of State 
co-chaired the latest rounds with Secretary of Treasury Timothy Geithner, discussing 
issues ranging from the North Korean missile threat to clean fuel technology. Both 
leaders, President Obama and Hu Jintao, were very optimistic about the new era of 
cooperation, calling it “positive, cooperative and comprehensive.” They also reached an 
“extensive consensus” in dealing with the current global economic crises, as they both 
realized that they have a great stake in the global market and can only resolve these 
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challenging problems through mutual cooperation. During President Obama’s first visit 
to Beijing in November 2009, both presidents were able to “cement the centrality of the 
U.S.-China economic relationship … in many respects the relationship has been mutually 
beneficial and may have been the primary reason the financial crisis did not result in 
worldwide Great Depression.”116 
Table 1 summarizes the above analysis. The 1950s and 1960s were characterized 
by little to no economic interdependence, and no cooperation. The 1970s and 1980s saw 
the gradual emergence of economic interdependence, and low to medium levels of 
cooperation, while the last two decades have been characterized by a greater level of 
economic interdependence and higher level of cooperation. Economic interdependence 
led to the gradual development of bilateral cooperation in an array of fields and 
increasingly effectively management of the tensions that have arisen in recent decades. 
Both countries have benefited greatly from the symbiotic relationship developed over the 
years, making cooperation largely self-sustaining over time. The U.S.-China relationship 
will probably continue to face tough challenges. However, historical evidence shows that 
as long as economic interdependence hold these countries together, cooperation in many 
areas will be possible. In an era of great global challenges, such as economic crisis, the 
environment energy resource, terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, 
and others, China and the U.S. continue to work toward consensus and compromise as 

















Table 1.   U.S.-China post-1950s Economic Relations, Challenges and Cooperation. 
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III.  CONCLUSION 
This thesis evaluates the probability of the U.S. and China engaging in conflict 
over energy resources in places like Africa. The evidence does not support realist 
assertions that economic interdependence and resource competition lead to war. It shows 
instead an evolution of U.S.-China relations in which economic interdependence has 
increased the level of cooperation in multiple fields over a period of thirty years.  
First, resource wars between U.S. and China are less likely to occur in the current 
international environment compared to the wars of the twentieth century. Although 
resources conflict between trading countries played a role during World War I, the level 
of interdependence was lower than it is for the U.S. and China today. Germany and Japan 
were more dependent on resources located abroad than in the case of U.S. and China 
today. Moreover, U.S. and China energy resource investments are much more diversified 
than that of Japan prior to the World War II. Japan’s overwhelming dependence on U.S. 
energy exports made it difficult to carry out its imperial ambitions once Washington 
imposed sanctions on energy exports.   
During contemporary times, the level of economic interdependence has deepened 
even among energy dependent countries. Moreover, the forces of globalization have 
created a web of countries and institutions that are linked together causing them to work 
closer together to solve their differences before tensions turn into war. This was first 
made possible by changes in the international environment after WWII and even greater 
during the post-Cold War era, which allowed economics to play an important role in 
creating a more peaceful and more cooperative international environment. U.S. and China 
embraced these new opportunities in order to maximize mutual interests. 
Both countries have benefited greatly from the symbiotic relationship they 
developed over the years. The U.S.’ economic relations with China helped it realize a 
more prosperous environment at home and gain significant international influential and 
respect. As China grew in global power and influence, so too did its global responsibility, 
accountability, and interests. The process did not occur without any obstacles; like any 
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relationship, both grew and learned from each other over time. However, economic 
interdependence and engagement acted as the strong glue that held the relationship 
together through the tough times.  
Over a period of six decades, the U.S. and China went from being engaged in war 
with each other, to nations that significantly depend on each other for their economic 
growth and prosperity. As their economic relationship grew deeper in the 1980s and 
1990s, so did their level of cooperation in various areas. Both confronted each other on a 
series of issues ranging from economics to security in nature, but none was serious 
enough to break their bond. The evolution their relationship helped develop improved 
mechanisms to deal with conflict resolution and build trust. This created a strong 
condition whereby these economic giants were able to cooperate in a greater array of 
fields in the post-9/11 period.  
The U.S.-China relationship will probably continue to face difficult challenges. 
However, historical evidence suggests that cooperation in many areas will be more 
possible as long as economic interdependence joins these countries together. In an era of 
great global challenges, such as economic crisis, climate change, energy competition, 
terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and others, China and the U.S. 
will very likely continue to work toward consensus and compromise as they work 
together to tackle greater global challenges.   
A. IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S.-CHINA RESOURCE COMPETITION IN 
AFRICA 
The U.S. and China have made substantial efforts to diversify their energy 
resources investment. Both are now investing considerably more in the Caspian, Latin 
American, and African regions. They have also launched new efforts to invest in 
alternative sources of energy. “By 2013, China and the U.S. renewable energy markets 
are projected to reach $43.0 billion and $13.0 billion, respectively.”117 The Obama 
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administration has made some progress toward allocating investment funds in several 
alternative sources of energy. It has also reserved a portion of the stimulus package to 
creating a safer and more efficient energy grid. Additionally, the government has 
promoted and incentivized the commercial and individual move towards investing in 
more efficient means of transportation and appliances.  
Despite the fact that many Western scholars and pundits continue to voice 
concerns about competition for these resources in similar areas, the evidence presented 
here offers not support for such alarmist and scandalous rhetoric. Most of investment by 
these countries does not encroach on the others’ direct areas of investment. Africa makes 
up approximately one third of China’s oil imports. China’s investment is mostly 
concentrated in Sudan, Algeria, and to a smaller extent Angola, Tunisia, Libya and 
Gabon. However, Sudan comprises of more than 80 percent of African oil exports to 
China.118 Africa makes up approximately 15 percent of U.S. oil imports. Its investment is 
mostly concentrated in Angola and Algeria. Although the U.S. expects its dependence on 
African oil to increase to approximately 25 percent by next decade, its investment is 
much more diversified than China’s. Furthermore, the U.S. energy resource interests in 
African countries mostly lie on off-shore oil platforms, whereas China’s energy resource 
investments are located inland. These factors help refute alarmists’ prediction of an 
impending U.S.-China resource war. 
The U.S. and China have reached an epic opportunity in their relationship. Their 
global leadership and influence and their levels of energy dependence place them in a 
unique position to solve an important global challenge—energy resource management. 
Given the cooperative relationship that they have been able to develop over the years, 
rooted in economic interdependence, and their historical contacts in the field of energy, 
China and the U.S. can launch a major effort to transform the manner in which energy is 
used around the globe. The U.S. and China can tap into their strengths and experience in 
the energy field in order to mitigate future conflict and build a more stable and 
prosperous future for a major part of the globe.  
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In the past three decades, the U.S. and China have had some degree of energy 
cooperation at multiple levels, such as diplomatic, scientific and technical. Initial 
progress was slow; however, energy cooperation has strengthened over time as they have 
realized that their economic and industrial growth have made significant impact on global 
scale. As the world’s largest consumers of energy, the U.S. and China have placed a large 
demand on energy resources, and this demand has had detrimental impact on the 
environment. Consequently, these challenges could not be solved without the cooperation 
of the other.  
U.S.-China cooperation in the field of energy was relatively negligible in the 
beginning of their relationship, but they began to cooperate in this area to a greater extent 
in the early 1980s, before China even became an oil importer. The official engagement 
began in 1979 when President Carter signed a scientific and technical cooperation 
agreement.119 Subsequently, President Ronald Reagan began to treat energy cooperation 
with China as a higher priority. This was reflected by the signing of the Protocol on 
Cooperation in the Field of Fossil Energy and Research and Development in 1985. This 
same year the U.S. and China signed the Peaceful use of Nuclear Technology, which was 
later ratified in 1998.120 In 1993, the Lawrence Berkeley National Lab, Advanced 
International Studies Unit, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory assisted China in 
establishing the Beijing Energy Efficient Center.121 
In 1998, President Clinton and Jiang Zemin held an oil and gas forum for the 
purpose of gaining greater understanding of their energy demands and to ascertain areas 
of energy policy reform in order to ultimately create a more stable global energy 
market.122 Later on Washington and Beijing undertook a forum on environment and 
development headed by Vice President Gore and China’s Premeer Zhu Rongji.123 
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Subsequently, the U.S. and China have been meeting in this forum annually. In 2004, 
U.S. Energy Secretary Abraham Spencer and Zhang Guobao, vice chairman of the 
National Development and Reform Commission, signed a memorandum of understanding 
on Sino-U.S. energy policy dialogue, aimed at facilitating greater understanding of each 
other’s challenges and opportunities in the energy sector.124  
B. RECOMMENDATION 
The above history shows that U.S.-China relationship possess the strong elements 
that bond them together to work more closely to solve many of the global energy 
challenges that effect both parties. They have essentially already embarked in a trajectory 
to deal with these problems, but they yet to scratch the surface. A high-level energy 
regime should be created between U.S. and China to focus on cooperative ways in which 
both countries can reduce energy dependence, share technology associated with 
alternative sources of energy, and mitigate factors that can lead to misunderstanding in 
this area. The Strategic Economic and Senior Dialogue and the Energy Policy Dialogue 
can act as launching pad for a more focused Energy regime.  
 It may incorporate lessons learned from broader discussions held at the 
Strategic Economic and Senior Dialogue and develop methods to manage 
security challenges, which fuel tension between these partners, such as 
Taiwan Straits, Human Rights, and broader economic differences as trade 
imbalances, currency disparities, and unfair labor practices.  
 The U.S.-China energy cooperative regime should first look at specific 
geographic areas in which they can minimize encroachment on their 
investments. With regard to Africa, U.S. and China should consider 
establishing an Africa specific Energy Cooperation Working Group. 
 Through increased dialogue, they should work on defining their goals and 
concerns about energy security, so that each party can gain greater 
understanding of each other’s goals and concerns.  
 Both countries should come up with better mechanism to keep their 
companies accountable in order to mitigate counterproductive paths. Open 
and frequent dialogue can help establish better business practices, which 
can reduce some of the obstacles that hinder progress.  
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 Such a regime may help bring about ideas regarding the domestic policies 
that must be implemented in each country to have a significant effect on 
energy security, reduce dependency, stabilizes oil prices, reduce the use of 
unclean energy and increase the alternative energy resources.  
 The U.S. and China should maximize cooperation based on each country’s 
individual strengths in order to push forward more efficient energy and 
more effective practices within this field. The U.S. can tap into its research 
capacities and innovative scientists, while China can tap its relatively 
inexpensive labor pool. Working cooperatively in energy research will 
benefit both. Overemphasis in protectionism is motivated by fear and 
mistrust, and hinders progress.  
In summary, over the last thirty years the U.S. and China’s economic relationship 
has been the foundation for the development of a significant cooperative relationship, 
which can be further leveraged in order to tackle their future energy challenges. 
Cooperation was limited in the beginning, as the level of economic incentive and trust 
were less significant. However, their economic relationship gradually grew deeper over 
the years until finally reaching the level of economic interdependence necessary to leap 
forward onto a more cooperative relation. Now that they both face similar energy 
challenges, it is incumbent upon China and the U.S. to work to strengthen their 
relationship and find solutions to this problem by way of forming an energy cooperative 
regime.  
The concerns of many realists with regard to power and self-interest are not 
entirely off the table insofar as the U.S. and China is concerned; power, misunderstanding 
and miscommunication has and will probably lead to some disagreements and tenuous 
circumstances. However, the evidence offered in this thesis helps support the liberal 
assumption laid out above. The economic relations leads to greater cooperation and 
understanding, which ultimately helps reduce the factors that lead to conflict. The 
cooperation in a myriad of fields is grounded in robust economic interdependence. This 
has opened the doors to tackling global problems, such as energy dependence, 
environmental side effects caused by inefficient use of energy resources, and the 
coordination and avoidance of encroachment of each other’s access to energy resources 
around the world.  
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Managing these challenges can be accomplished best by strengthening their 
cooperation through a robust energy cooperation regime. Only then can these countries 
begin to solve their own energy challenges, which also affect the entire globe in terms 
price instability and pollutions. More importantly, solving these issues through 
cooperation will help reduce the chances of future conflict.  
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APPENDIX. U.S. INVESTMENT IN CHINA 






All figures below are expressed in millions of U.S. dollars for U.S. exports, U.S. 
imports and the balance per year. 
 
Year U.S. Exports U.S. Imports Balance 
2008 69,732.8 337,772.6 -268,039.8
2007 62,936.9 321,442.9 -258,506.0
2006 53,673.0 287,774.4 -234,101.3
2005 41,192.0 243,470.1 -202,278.1
2004 34,427.8 196,682.0 -162,254.3
2003 28,367.9 152,436.1 -124,068.2
2002 22,127.7 125,192.6 -103,064.9
2001 19,182.3 102,278.4 -83,096.1
2000 16,185.2 100,018.2 -83,833.0
1999 13,111.1 81,788.2 -68,677.1
1998 14,241.2 71,168.6 -56,927.4
1997 12,862.2 62,557.7 -49,695.5
1996 11,992.6 51,512.8 -39,520.2
1995 11,753.7 45,543.2 -33,789.5
1994 9,281.7 38,786.8 -29,505.1
1993 8,762.9 31,539.9 -22,777.0
1992 7,418.5 25,727.5 -18,309.0
1991 6,278.2 18,969.2 -12,691.0
1990 4,806.4 15,237.4 -10,431.0
1989 5,755.4 11,989.7 -6,234.3
1988 5,021.6 8,510.9 -3,489.3
1987 3,497.3 6,293.6 -2,796.3
1986 3,106.3 4,771.0 -1,664.7
1985 3,855.7 3,861.7 -6.0
1984 3,004. 3,381 -377
 
 45





Capital Investment Percent of Total FDI 
Outflows 
1 China $130,021,000,000 13.56 percent 
2 India $60,045,112,217 6.26 percent 
3 UK $49,795,898,716 5.19 percent 
4 Canada $42,032,033,333 4.38 percent 
5 Russia $40,932,490,000 4.27 percent 
6 Germany $30,529,716,685 3.18 percent 
7 Australia $29,731,563,040 3.10 percent 
8 Japan $28,291,405,541 2.95 percent 
9 Mexico $25,251,070,000 2.63 percent 
10 South Korea $23,420,720,151 2.44 percent 
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